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Abstract 
Recent empirical work on the 2008-09 financial crisis has found mixed results on the 
usefulness of indicators to explain the cross-country variation in the incidence of the crisis 
in non-originating countries.  While some authors have found success with various 
indicators, Rose and Spiegel (2009a,b) find that almost no indicators are robust.  We 
employ Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to verify Rose-Spiegel’s conclusions under model 
uncertainty, confirming their findings.  We then employ latent class models (LCM) to check 
the data for parameter heterogeneity.  We find that there is substantial evidence of 
heterogeneity in the relationship between various indicators and crisis impact, both across 
individual indicators as well as across financial crisis episodes. In particular, a similar 
model fits the 1997 Asian financial crisis, although the coefficients change qualitatively in 
some cases.   These results highlight the difficulty in employing simple linear models for 
early warning purposes, but demonstrate that there are robust indicators of cross-country 
variation in crisis impact across episodes, such as the pre-crisis growth in banking credit.   
A 2-class model explains the variation in crisis impact, where pre-crisis level of per-capita 
income assists in the prediction of membership in a particular class. 
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1. Introduction
Since the onset of the financial crisis of 2008, researchers have been quick to begin
developing empirical models to both explain the variation in the severity of the crisis 
across countries, and to assess the ability of empirical models to predict future crises1.  
Much work has been done identifying and assessing the empirical robustness of individual 
indicators in terms of their ability to explain the differential economic impacts of various 
sources of crisis contagion, particularly on countries outside of the epicenter. Identifying 
which indicators serve as important determinants of crisis severity, in terms of sources of 
crisis contagion and domestic fundamentals, is an important first step towards building a 
model to predict future crises; i.e., an early warning system.  It is the hope of researchers 
that building such early warning models (EWM's) will allow more accurate prediction of 
future crises.  This must be done along three dimensions, as pointed out in Rose and 
Spiegel (2009a), including the identification of the most appropriate measures of the crisis 
itself, identification of the relevant indicators, and the determination of the appropriate 
time horizons for which changes in indicators may be suggestive of a potential crisis.  Here, 
like in Rose and Spiegel (2009a,b), we are mainly concerned with the identification of 
relevant indicators, with a focus on the real costs of a crisis to economies.   
A large body of literature exists regarding the development of EWM's in the context 
of previous crises2.  Motivated by the latest crisis, a new body of literature reevaluating the 
usefulness of indicators has emerged.  For example, Berkmen et al. (2009) provide one of 
the first attempts to empirically identify crisis correlates relevant to the 2008-09 crisis 
using cross-country regressions3.  They find that a small set of variables can explain a large 
share of the variation in real economic impact, including cumulative credit growth, the 
degree of leverage, and exchange rate flexibility.  They do not find a role for the level of 
international reserves, and mixed results for trade channels.  Blanchard et al. (2010) 
examine a set of emerging market economies and use a simple theoretical model to 
characterize the potential role of trade and financial channels in transmitting the crisis. The 
authors employ simple cross-country OLS regressions and find evidence that short-term 
external debt and unexpected trading partner growth played a role in determining the 
severity of the crisis for emerging market countries.  Somewhat weaker evidence is 
provided that the size of the current account also played a role.  Similar to Berkmen et al. 
(2009), they were unable to find a role for international reserves.   
1 The sources of the 2008 crisis are well documented, see Shoham and Pelzman (2011) and Claessens et al. (2010) 
for detailed reviews. 
2
 See Frankel and Saravelos (2011) for a broad survey of the results of earlier investigations into EWM indicators. 
3
 The authors focused on revisions to growth forecasts rather than actual growth rates, in part due to lack of 
available data at the time. 
Giannone et al. (2011), using various OLS specifications, examine the role of several 
measures of regulation in explaining variation in crisis severity across countries.  They find 
evidence of a link between financial liberalization and vulnerability to shocks.  Similarly, 
Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2010) use cross-country regressions and find evidence of a link 
between pre-crisis domestic financial and macroeconomic factors and various measures of 
total output, domestic demand, and consumption growth during the crisis.  Particularly, 
evidence is provided of a link between credit growth and current account deficits with 
output decline on the financial side, and trade openness and the manufacturing share with 
output decline on the real side.   
The above works are intimately related to a branch of the existing literature that 
focuses on contagion in terms of equity market portfolios.  This literature has been helpful 
in identifying channels of transmission in the context of different exposures. For example, 
Beltratti and Stultz (2009) examine the returns of large banks before and during the crisis, 
finding a role for country-level regulation and supervision in determining the impact of the 
crisis on returns.  Ehrmann et al. (2009) find that portfolios with more integration with US 
markets performed worse during the crisis.  They also find evidence of a role for country 
level risk, particularly in terms of macroeconomic fundamentals, including the level of 
foreign exchange reserves, sovereign ratings, and current account positions.  This result is 
not unlike that found from cross-country regressions done in the works discussed above.  
Eichengreen et al. (2009) examine differences in bank credit default swap (CDS) spreads, 
looking for movements of common factors.  The authors find that bank performance overall 
tends to move together in normal times, but that the role of the common factor was greatly 
increased at the height of the crisis.  
Recent works have seen serious attempts to identify indicators that could be 
potentially considered to have a robust impact on crisis transmission across a range of 
regression specifications. These studies are motivated by the desire to build a form of 
empirical early warning model.  For example, Rose and Spiegel (2009a,b) use a Multiple 
Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model to test the robustness of a vast array of potential 
crisis indicators, both in terms of domestic vulnerabilities and international contagion.  A 
key feature of the model employed here is that the severity of the crisis is treated as a 
latent variable reflected through various indicators, including crisis period economic 
growth, the change in the SDR (Special Drawing Rights) exchange rate, the change in 
sovereign credit rating, and the change in the value of the national stock market.  Through a 
simple system of equations, the latent 'crisis severity' variable is linked to a wide range of 
potential indicators or causes.  Examining each potential cause one by one within the 
MIMIC framework, the authors find few variables to be statistically significant. After 
several robustness tests, the authors conclude that there is little evidence that any 
proposed indicators can be empirically linked to variation in crisis incidence in a robust 
manner, casting serious doubt about the ability to construct an effective EWM with readily 
available data. 
In a similar study, Frankel and Saravelos (2011) provide an extensive review of the 
financial crisis literature that predates the 2008-09 crisis, in an effort to avoid inclusion 
bias.  Carefully scrutinizing the earlier EWM literature, they take a tally of variables that 
have been found to be significant in over 80 relevant studies. They then proceed to use 
their findings as a guideline in their own empirical investigation of the 2008-09 crisis.  
Similar to Rose and Spiegel (2009a,b), the authors estimate a large number of bivariate 
regressions using a host of crisis causes proposed in the literature.  They differ, however, in 
that simple OLS is employed, using a single dependent variable at a time (they use several 
different dependent variables reflecting real and financial crisis manifestations to check 
robustness across specifications).  Contrary to the work of Rose and Spiegel (2009a,b), the 
authors found several variables to be significant and robust indicators, including the real 
effective exchange rate and the level of international reserves.   
In light of many of the previous studies cited above, Rose and Spiegel (2010) revisit 
their previous analysis with up to date data and methods.  Following the methodology 
found in many of the above studies, Rose and Spiegel (2010) employ simple OLS and a 
single dependent variable (various definitions of crisis period growth), and check the 
robustness of their results to this improved data and standardized methodology.  They are 
able to confirm their previous findings that very few, if any, of around 100 empirical 
indicators can be linked to cross-country crisis incidence in a robust fashion.  Notably, any 
variables that appear to be statistically significant in a bivariate regression are often 
insignificant when additional variables are included simultaneously, casting doubt on the 
evidence provided by many of the studies relying on this approach. 
While the above works suggest that multiple indicators may be potentially useful in 
explaining the cross-country variation in the incidence of the crisis in non-originating 
countries, they suffer from a range of methodological deficiencies. First, the vast majority of 
these studies do not properly account for the substantial amount of theory uncertainty 
inherent in the empirical analysis. An important reason for this uncertainty is the inherent 
open-endedness of theories of crisis transmission. The idea of theory open-endedness was 
articulated in Brock and Durlauf (2001) in the empirical growth context. Like growth 
theories, theories of crisis origination and contagion are open-ended in the sense that the 
inclusion of a particular theory of crisis transmission; e.g., growth in banking credit, does 
not automatically preclude other theories from also being included in the true model. The 
result is substantial uncertainty as to which variables (that proxy for theories) should be 
included in any given regression. Depending on the variables that are included, the 
coefficient estimates for crisis indicators of interest could (and often do) vary substantially 
across studies.  
A second weakness of the papers described above is that they typically assume a 
homogenous linear specification. That is, existing works investigating the effect of crisis 
indicators on contagion typically ignore the possibility that these indicators may exhibit 
substantively heterogeneous effects across different subsets of countries. A notable 
exception is Rose and Spiegel (2009a,b), who carried out several robustness exercises 
including splitting of the sample and including multiple regressors simultaneously. 
However, the sample splitting was carried out in an ad hoc manner, and it is unclear if the 
resulting subsamples truly reflect the component populations in the data. The possibility 
that complex nonlinearities and parameter heterogeneity are present in the data has 
generally not been thoroughly addressed. 
We therefore have two aims in this paper. We first address the issue of model 
uncertainty. Specifically, we check the robustness of the results provided by Rose and 
Spiegel (2009a,b) and Rose and Spiegel (2010) to model uncertainty, applying Bayesian 
model averaging (BMA) to the updated dataset appearing in the latter paper4.  BMA has 
been employed extensively in the growth literature to incorporate model uncertainty 
explicitly into inference; see, for example, Brock and Durlauf (2001), Fernandez et al. 
(2001).  Rather than basing inference on a particular model or set of models, Bayesian 
model averaging bases inference explicitly on the entire space of possible models, 
circumventing the potential issue of a result being the outcome of a single specification or 
small set of specifications.  A posterior probability distribution is estimated for each 
regressor, which is based on the calculated posterior model probabilities of each model 
that includes that regressor. Using this approach, our findings confirm the negative results 
from Rose and Spiegel (2010). We find, as they do, that the vast majority of variables are 
statistically insignificant, with low inclusion probabilities and large standard errors.  We 
find that this result holds when altering several key parameters of BMA estimation, such as 
model and g-priors.  These results contrast with those found in other studies, such as 
Giannone et al. (2011) who find a significant role for several variables including the size of 
the current account and the index of credit market regulations, when using BMA under 
similar model assumptions.  Using a set of similarly defined variables in the model space, 
we do not find any robust indicators, having coefficient estimates with similarly large 
standard errors.  The results of BMA analyses in this context are sensitive to the number of 
observations and the variables included in the model space5. 
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 This dataset is publicly available to download from Andrew K. Rose's personal website 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm#GreatRecession. 
5
 The replication includes the majority of variables used in the cited paper, including the top 5 reported variables 
by posterior inclusion probability.  Some variables are dropped due to lack of availability or the reduction in the 
number of observations due to missing values.  We have a balanced panel of 38 countries.  Discrepancy could be 
the result of data revision, lost observations, or differing data sources.  However, the difficulty in replication 
highlights the sensitivity of results to changes in the data, which is an issue in this context. 
We next investigate whether the lack of robust findings are an artifact of the 
homogeneity assumption by allowing for heterogeneity and nonlinearity within the context 
of latent class models (LCM).  Latent class models are a form of finite-mixture models, 
which explicitly search the data for the existence of heterogeneous sub-populations by 
including a latent variable representing unobserved sub-populations or 'classes', and uses 
model selection criteria to guide the choice of the model with the appropriate number of 
classes. Between classes, any or all parameters may or may not be heterogeneous.  The 
non-linearity we refer to with regards to this approach lies in its model-based sample 
splitting technique, where separate models apply to distinct classes, but a single linear 
model applies within a given class.  Additionally, specific variables (covariates) may aid in 
determining the probability by which observations will belong to a particular class. We 
again employ the dataset of Rose and Spiegel (2010).  In contrast with our findings in the 
linear context, our LCM results suggest that some indicators are potentially important 
determinants of variation in crisis incidence. Countries can generally be split into two 
classes, where the real impacts of various categories of explanatory variables are not 
identical between classes.  
This modeling approach appears to reveal some interesting heterogeneous 
relationships in crisis impact across countries for the 2008-09 episode, although the 
heterogeneity in the model appears to change across crisis episodes.  This result highlights 
the potential futility of simple linear models for early warning purposes.  Put another way, 
there is a set of variables that do explain variation in the economic impact of financial 
crises, but the relationship of some variables with variation in crisis incidence appears to 
change across episodes.  To arrive at this conclusion, we test the preferred specification 
fitting the 2008-09 crisis to data from the 1997 Asian financial crisis period.  
Heterogeneous relationships between the chosen set of variables and crisis impact persist, 
although for some variables the sign of the coefficients change across episodes.  Of 
particular interest is the pre-crisis growth in banking credit variable, which is a robust 
indicator across specifications and crisis episodes, maintaining its qualitative and 
quantitative interpretation.  Similarly, a 2-class model best fits crisis experience across the 
sample periods, where pre-crisis level of per capita income assists in predicting which 
countries belong to either class. 
Using the LCM modeling approach, we find that the level of pre-crisis income 
influences the probability of belonging to a particular class, with wealthier countries more 
likely to belong to Class 1, and poorer countries more likely to belong to Class 2.  Within 
classes, some parameters are heterogeneous. We provide evidence that particularly strong 
indicators of crisis period output impact include the growth in pre-crisis credit provided by 
the banking sector, whether or not a country is a major commodity exporter, the pre-crisis 
inflation rate, the size of the pre-crisis current account, and limited evidence of a role for 
pre-crisis stock market capitalization and credit market regulation.  In many cases the 
coefficients for these indicators are significantly different between classes.  We also 
provide evidence that other indicators are empirically relevant, but weaker in terms of 
statistical significance.  Specifically, pre-crisis growth in banking credit had a negative 
impact on growth for both classes, but this effect is larger in magnitude for Class 2.  The 
effect of CPI inflation was either beneficial or at least nonnegative for countries in Class 1, 
while it harmed the growth performance of countries in Class 2.  Similarly, status as a 
commodity exporter is associated with higher growth rates for Class 1 but lower growth 
for Class 2.  The degree of stock market capitalization preceding the crisis appears to have 
been harmful for Class 2 but beneficial to Class 1.  Several variables regarding the state of 
the financial sector are relevant to Class 2, but exhibit a statistically weaker relationship to 
Class 1.  This leads us to conclude that parameter heterogeneity is important to the crisis 
model, and that great care should be taken regarding the existence of these relationships 
when building early warning models of crisis incidence and contagion.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 introduces Bayesian model averaging, the 
data set with which it is applied, and the results from that exercise.  Section 3 introduces 
latent class modeling and the results from estimation using that particular framework.  
Section 4 provides tests of robustness including the fitting of the model to an alternative 
crisis episode, and section 5 concludes. 
 2.  Model Uncertainty 
 Rose and Spiegel (2010) find that almost none of roughly 100 indicators can be 
linked to cross-country crisis incidence in a robust manner.  Our first task is to check 
whether or not these particular results are robust to model uncertainty.  A look through the 
crisis literature reveals the uncertainty in specifying an appropriate empirical model of 
financial crises.  The simple theoretical model used by Blanchard (2010) provides some 
guidance as to the type of variables we may wish to focus on in an empirical analysis, but 
its simplicity and ad-hoc nature leads us to believe that there may be far more sources of 
contagion to consider, and the theory to motivate each and every one either doesn’t yet 
exist or cannot be combined into an all-encompassing crisis model that explains the 
different experience of each individual country across the globe.  Additionally, the inclusion 
of one theory of crisis contagion should not logically exclude other theories from being 
included in the model space, as researchers have provided evidence in favor of, or 
contradicting, various theories.  Lastly, an additional attractive feature of BMA is that it 
allows researchers to consider many variables even when the potential number of 
observations is relatively small, as is usually the case for cross-country regression analysis. 
Taking these concerns into consideration, we choose to employ an empirical methodology 
that explicitly accounts for model uncertainty known as Bayesian model averaging (BMA).   
 To summarize the BMA methodology, we begin by considering a simple linear 
regression model given by equation (1): 
 
(1)      y = α + Zjβj + ϵ 
 
Where y is a vector of responses for n individuals regressed on an intercept and an n x k 
matrix of variables, and β is the vector of k regression coefficients.  BMA allows us to 
consider the entire set of k variables, including all subsets.  Therefore, BMA considers a set 
of 2k possible models which differ from each other by the set of included regressors.  
Denoting any individual model (combination of regressors) as Mj, the prior probability of 
any one model being the ‘true’ model is given by (2): 
 
(2)         P(Mj) = pj, j = 1…2k, pj > 0 and     
  
      
 
The importance of (2) lies in the implicit notion that the 'true' model is located within the 
model space.  This formulation requires a statement of the prior probability of each 
individual model in the model space.  With no substantial prior information to give weight 
to any one model over another before estimation, we assume the random hierarchical prior 
suggested by Ley and Steel (2009).  This prior was designed to minimize the influence of 
prior probabilities on posterior results.  As a robustness check,  we also employ a uniform 
prior over models thereby giving each model in the model space an equal prior weight.  
BMA allows us to then explicitly incorporate model uncertainty by treating a quantity of 
interest Δ as an average of the posterior distributions of that quantity estimated within 
each model, weighting each estimate by the posterior model probabilities.  The 
probabilities are calculated according to Baye's rule.  This process is represented by 
equation (3): 
 
(3)                            
  
    
 
D represents the data, while the quantity of interest Δ may be any estimated parameter 
such as the β parameters for each variable.  The summation of the posterior probabilities of 
the inclusion of a variable under each particular model containing that variable provides 
the marginal posterior probability of inclusion.  This is the essence of BMA as a method for 
incorporating model uncertainty.   
 In terms of our application, the dependent variable used is 2008-09 economic 
growth reported by the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the model space includes sets of 
predictors chosen by various categories of international contagion factors and domestic 
macroeconomic fundamentals.  The data come directly from Rose and Spiegel (2010), 
including a rather comprehensive collection of crisis correlates suggested in the literature 
on the subject. These variables fall under many categories, of which are organized in Table 
1 below.   The data set covers 107 countries, although missing data reduces the effective 
number of observations in our empirical analysis to varying degrees.  The criteria for a 
country's inclusion in the analysis is a 2003 GDP per capita of at least $10,000.  For smaller 
nations, those with a population of at least one million and a real GDP per capita of at least 
$4,000 are also included.  Table 2 reports the full sample of countries.     
 The first category of variables include simple controls for country size and income 
reflected by the log of real GDP per capita and the log of total population in 2006.  The 
second category of independent variables, 'financial policies', includes variables reflecting 
the institutional structure of the financial sector, such as the degree of credit market 
regulation variable from the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Index.  Some other key 
variables falling under this category include 'official supervisory power', 'overall capital 
stringency', and 'power to declare insolvency'.  Most of these variables are of the index 
form. These variables are found in a branch of the literature that considers the role of 
regulation in crisis exposure, such as Giannone et al. (2011).  
 The next set of categories reflect the characteristics of the financial sector. Category 
3, or 'financial conditions', includes variables that signal the health and level of 
development of the financial sector.  Some of the key variables in this category include the 
'private sector domestic credit share of GDP', the 'change in banking credit from 2000-
2006', the 'change in private credit from 2000-2006', the 'bank non-performing loan ratio', 
'bank capital', and 'bank liquid reserves'. These variables are commonly found in empirical 
work that considers financial sector health in generating exposure to crises.  
 Categories 4-6 reflect international and domestic macroeconomic forces such as 
asset prices, macroeconomic policies, and imbalances.  Specifically, category 4 includes 
variables reflecting the movement of asset prices leading up to the crisis, such as the 
change in real estate prices from 2000-2006 and stock market capitalization between 
2000-2006.  These variables are important to the latest crisis, as several key countries 
experienced housing bubbles particularly.  Category 5 reflects international imbalances 
between countries.  Variables under this category are often sourced from the World Bank 
or IMF indicators databases and reflect such values as the size of the current account as a 
percentage of GDP, the type of exchange rate regime employed by a nation, total reserves 
as a percentage of GDP, the change in the real effective exchange rate between 2000-2006, 
and external short-term debt as a percentage of GDP.  Category 6 covers Macroeconomic 
policies, such as the level of CPI inflation, a variable indicating whether or not a country's 
central bank is an inflation targeting regime, a variable indicating whether or not a country 
is part of a monetary union, total debt as a percentage of GDP,  the GDP share of M2 or M3 
money, and the sovereign credit rating as measured by Moody's.   
 The final set of categories cover geography, institutions, and trade/financial linkages 
which are often found in the broader economic growth literature. Category 7 covers 
institutional factors specific to countries, such as the EFW index of credit/labor/business 
regulations, the Polity Index in 2006, various measures of regulatory quality, rule of law, 
political rights, voice and accountability, control of corruption, property rights, status as a 
financial center, total government size as a share of GDP, and status as an advanced 
economy.  Category 8 covers simple geographic controls, such as the log of latitude, 
regional dummies, and status as a commodity exporter.  Finally, category 9 includes 
variables representing financial and trade linkages with the crisis epicenter (US) including 
variables measuring the degree of countries' exposure to US assets, equity, long and short 
debt, and trade.  These variables represent the linkages and potential sources of contagion 
stemming from economic ties to the epicenter of a financial crisis, which is the US in this 
case. 
 The BMA analysis is estimated using the 'hyper' g-prior as well as the 'unit 
information prior' (UIP) for comparison.  Several variables from each category discussed 
above are included in the model space. We note that some variables have to be excluded 
because the limited number of observations they possess severely limits the information 
that can be used for estimation6.  We report results using the random/hierarchical model 
prior as suggest in Ley and Steel (2009).  Tables 3 and 4 provide the results of BMA 
estimation using the 'UIP' and the 'hyper' g-prior, respectively.  It is immediately clear that 
the selection of indicators show little statistical significance, even when addressing model 
selection issues using BMA in this crisis model context.  With a 'UIP' g-prior, no variables 
have an estimated posterior inclusion probability above 50% and not a single individual 
regressor is statistically significant.  This result is similar to the negative findings of Rose 
and Spiegel (2009a,b) and Rose and Spiegel (2010), arising from the limitations of linear 
and homogeneous models used in those papers, as we demonstrate in the next section.  The 
results do not change significantly when using a 'hyper' g-prior, with only one variable 
having a posterior inclusion probability above 50% and once again not a single statistically 
significant regressor.  As previously mentioned in the introduction, these results also 
contrast those by Giannone (2011) who find a statistically significant influence of several 
variables when using BMA analysis7.   
 In addition to the results reported in Tables 3 and 4, several alternative g-priors, 
model priors, and modifications to the model space were attempted but the results remain 
robustly negative.  Specifically, the 'BRIC' or benchmark g-prior and the 'EBL' or local 
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 Typically, we include no more than a few representative variables from the categories discussed.  Alterations to 
the model space include selecting different variables from each category. 
7
 The BMA analysis in this section includes slightly differing sets of variables from the Giannone et al. (2011) paper, 
although a replication including most of the variables from their analysis was part of the robustness checks we 
conducted. 
empirical Bayes g-prior were used to further check the robustness of the results, which do 
remain robust.  The reported results are robust still to the use of a uniform model prior.  
Additionally, different versions of the model space were tested, where variables that are 
similar in definition and category are used in substitution.  Regardless of such alterations to 
the model space, model prior, and g-prior, the reported results hold.  In the interest of 
space, we report only the results using a representative model space and both the 'UIP' and 
'hyper' g-priors and the random/hierarchical model prior. 
3. Latent Class Models 
 Having checked the robustness of the results of Rose and Spiegel (2009a,b) and 
Rose and Spiegel (2010) to model uncertainty, we now proceed to revisit the data under a 
new set of assumptions.  To address the potential heterogeneity in modeling crisis 
experiences across countries, we employ the use of latent class models (LCM)8.  We begin 
by introducing LCM analysis, in particular the latent class regression model. 
 Latent class models are a form of finite mixture models which identify segmentation 
in a sample through the use of categorical latent variables which represent a ‘cluster’ or 
‘class’.  The advantage of LCM models over traditional cluster or segmentation models lies 
in the model based approach that LCM uses to classify ‘cases’ into the appropriate segment.  
LCM software allows the estimation of various forms of LC analysis, but for our purposes 
we employ the LC regression model.  The key features of the LC regression model can be 
stated as follows.  Like a traditional regression model, LC regression is used to predict a 
single dependent variable as a function of a set of predictors.  However, the LC regression 
model contains a K-category latent variable representing the unobserved homogeneous 
subpopulation or cluster.  Furthermore, by identifying different segments or clusters in the 
data, we are able to relax the assumption that a single model exists for each individual 
cluster.  Specifically, LC regression allows parameters to vary between clusters as well as 
the set of included variables.  In particular, LCM models allow the β parameter of any 
indicator to be constrained to zero for one or more classes, in practice allowing different 
variables to appear in each model for each class, with or without overlap.  LC regression 
models also allow the use of covariates to aid in the identification and description of each 
cluster. 
 For our purposes, a plausible interpretation of a k-cluster cross-country crisis model 
would be a model that assigns each country in our sample to a different category of 
structural exposure or vulnerability to economic impact (in terms of growth) according to 
posterior membership probability, estimated directly from the model.  To this end we are 
able to address heterogeneity in our sample according to various levels of financial crisis 
exposure or vulnerability, specifically in non-originating (non-US) countries.  The addition 
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 Estimation of LCM was carried out using LatentGOLD 4.0. 
of covariates aids in description of clusters and the estimation of posterior membership 
probabilities.  In the following paragraphs we will discuss how LC regression models are 
estimated. 
 The general LCM model identifies ‘classes’ or ‘clusters’ through the use of single or 
multiple response variables or ‘indicators’, and optionally through the use of covariates.  
The basic probability structure is given by equation (4) where y is a vector of T response 
variables, or indicators, for individual i, and z is a vector of j covariates.  X represents the K-
category latent variable or cluster. 
 
(4)                  
            
             
 
   
 
    
 
 The default assumption is that given class membership, each indicator is mutually 
independent.  This assumption can be relaxed, however, if one groups indicators into H 
sets.  The LC regression model, as we implement it, involves some modifications to the 
framework given in (4).  Most notably, the LC regression model makes use of a single 
dependent variable. 
The chosen dependent variable for our model is 2008-09 economic growth from the 
Economist Intelligence Unit9. The LC regression model makes a distinction between the set 
of independent variables z used to predict the dependent variables (predictors), and the set 
of variables used to identify cluster membership (covariates).  The set of z variables that 
are used as predictors in our models include a large collection of potential crisis causes and 
contagion suggested by the early warning literature, measured in 2006 or earlier to avoid 
issues of endogeneity.  These variables fall under many categories, of which are organized 
in Table 1 below.  Some of these variables can be considered direct sources of contagion, 
such as financial and trade variables, while others control for heterogeneity in institutions, 
geography, policies, etc.  When we choose to include a covariate, we use the log of 2006 
GDP per capita10.  Most of these variables can be found in much of the cross-country 
empirical work on the 2008-09 financial crisis.  The data set covers 107 countries, although 
missing data reduces the effective number of observations in our empirical analysis to 
varying degrees.  The criteria for inclusion in the sample is identical to that appearing in 
the subsection on BMA above. 
 The general probability structure specific to the LC Regression model is given by 
equation (5): 
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 Rose and Spiegel (2010) note that the majority of the recent financial crisis literature focuses primarily on growth 
effects, so we focus our attention on the 08-09 growth rate variable as the dependent variable in our BMA and 
LCM regression analyses.   
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 Many variables were tested for use as a covariate, but the log of 2006 GDP per capita was by far the most 
consistent and robust covariate. 
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When using continuous dependent variables, LC Cluster models make use of the following 
linear predictor given by equation (6): 
 
(6)                                                                           
     
    
 
βx0 is the class specific intercept value and βxq is the class specific regression coefficient for 
predictor q.  This equation defines the regression model specific to each latent class.  
LatentGOLD software also allows the feature of imposing restrictions on the parameters, 
such as class independent restrictions or no effect of a particular predictor on one or more 
classes.   
 The inclusion of covariates allows us to model the value of the latent variable as 
being determined from a joint multinomial distribution.  Therefore, the probability of 
membership in a given cluster is estimated using the standard multinomial logit model 
appearing in equation (7): 
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The linear term in this multinomial logit model is specified by equation (8): 
 
(8)                             
    
   , where      
 
    
 
The probability of membership in a given cluster x is conditional on the value of each 
covariate z. 
 To estimate the parameters specified in equations (6) and (8), LatentGOLD software 
makes use of the Maximum Likelihood method with the assistance of the Newton-Raphson 
and Expectations Maximization (EM) algorithms, essentially treating the existence of latent 
classes as a missing data problem11. The standard procedure for LCM estimation is to 
specify a range of classes, eg. 1-6, for which LCM estimates each model individually and 
reports a range of information criterion statistics for comparison and model selection.  For 
our purposes, since we will employ a relatively small sample typical of cross-country 
datasets, we select the best model according to either the BIC or the AICc criterion, choosing 
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 Further details of LCM estimation, including the equations above, can be found in the Latent GOLD 4.0 technical 
manual. 
the model with the lowest reported statistic12.  Our particular procedure for this paper is to 
first estimate LCM models using individual predictors one by one, with and without the use 
of covariates, and then estimate larger models with simultaneous sets of predictors based 
on the strength of results from the initial exercise. 
 We begin our empirical LCM analysis by following a procedure similar to that 
conducted in Frankel and Saravelos (2010), in which they examine each potential indicator 
one by one in the context of LC Regression estimation.  To this end, we search for potential 
heterogeneity in the relationship between crisis period growth and each potential source of 
crisis contagion in the context of bivariate LCM regressions, using 4 baseline models.  The 
first model uses only the predictor of interest without the aid of covariates.  The second 
model includes the log of 2006 GDP per capita as an additional covariate, the third includes 
GDP per capita as an additional predictor rather than a covariate, and the fourth and final 
model includes GDP per capita as both a predictor and a covariate.   
 Tables 5.1-5.4 report the results from this exercise. There are several pieces of 
information to take from the tables.  First, we report the model selection choice according 
to both the BIC and AICc information selection criterion.  For example, for the '2006 current 
account as a percentage of GDP' variable, the best model according to both information 
criterion statistics is a one class model except for case 2 (GDP per capita included as a 
covariate), where a 2 class model provides the best fit.  The adjacent columns report 
whether or not the variable was significant at the 10% level or better in a 1-class, 2-class, 
or 3-class LC Regression model.  Reporting “insign.” (in red) means that the variable was 
insignificant for all classes, “sign.” (in dark blue) means the variable is significant for all 
classes, and 1 class significance means that the variable was significant for at least 1 class 
(in light blue).  This exercise serves more than one purpose.  The first is to rule out 
variables that provide little reduced-form evidence of being relevant indicators in LCM 
models of crisis incidence, effectively narrowing the large set of potential candidates.  
Second, we search for heterogeneity in contagion relationships by seeking whether or not 
any crisis indicators have parameters that are statistically significantly different between 
the classes identified by the LCM model.  In other words, we search for evidence that the 
relationship between any particular variable and crisis performance may differ between 
classes.  Lastly, we try alternate specifications of the model to check the robustness of these 
results. 
 Tables 5.1-5.4 provide several interesting results.  Firstly, it is shown that many 
variables exhibit a statistically significant relationship with crisis period growth when used 
in a 1-class bivariate LC Regression.  When a 2 class or 3 class model is estimated, this set 
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 The justification for AICc as an appropriate small sample information criterion is given in Burnham and Anderson 
(2004). 
of significant variables shrinks, but many are still significant for at least 1 class.  When 
estimating bivariate regressions, most information criterion suggest 1 class models, 
although the notable exception is with case 2 (log of GDP per capita included as a 
covariate), where many regressions suggest 2 class models.  A notable example of this 
would be the current account/GDP ratio, which is significant in every model estimated and 
suggests a 2 class model for case 2 when selecting according to either BIC or AICc. 
 To summarize the key findings from Tables 5.1-5.4, we note that variables related to 
conditions in the financial sector tended to be more robustly significant across 
specifications, such as 'bank ownership', the 'bank non-performing loan ratio', bank 
claim/deposit ratio', 'change in banking credit', 'credit market regulations', 'foreign bank 
competition', and 'bank liquid reserves/asset ratio'.  These variables appear to be relatively 
robust indicators of crisis period growth performance.  A second set of variables that 
tended to perform relatively well included institutional/political variables such as the 
'dummy for advanced economy', the 'dummy for commodity exporter', 'civil liberties', 
'government effectiveness index', the 'polity index', 'property rights', 'regulatory quality', 
'rule of law', and the 'voice & accountability index'.  Some variables related to 
macroeconomic fundamentals performed relatively well also, including the 'size of the 
current account', 'external debt', 'net government borrowing/lending', and 'average growth 
of trading partners in 2008-09'13.  Other variables that performed relatively well included 
'real housing price appreciation 2000-2006', 'log of latitude', and a few select regional 
dummies.  Surprisingly, several variables that have been reported in the literature as being 
important or relevant fail to perform well in bivariate regressions.  These variables include 
the 'dummy for fixed exchange rate regime', the 'change in the real effective exchange rate', 
the 'percentage of total trade that is conducted with the USA', the 'dummy for financial 
center', and 'total reserves/GDP'.  'Market capitalization between 2003-2006' also provides 
fairly weak results.  
 Perhaps the most surprising result from the tables is the relatively weak 
explanatory power of variables related to exposure/contagion from the US.  All the US TIC 
variables related to debt/assets/equity appear to have little power in explaining the 
variations in crisis impact.  Similarly, exposure to US trade appears to have little 
explanatory power as well.  This result is interesting because it suggests that contagion (in 
terms of exposure to the epicenter of the crisis) effects were not important in determining 
the impact of the crisis across countries.  Rose and Spiegel (2009b) found this to be the 
case, and we once again corroborate this result.  It is likely that macroeconomic 
fundamentals and financial characteristics were more influential in determining the 
variation in the severity of the crisis.  It is well documented that the resulting panic at the 
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 The net government borrowing/lending and net government debt variables were added to the Rose and Spiegel 
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height of the crisis seized up access to credit in domestic and international markets, which 
carried over to international trade and likely caused much of the economic damage, rather 
than individual exposures to US markets, a claim that seems to be supported by the data. 
 Another key implication of the table is that it provides evidence of heterogeneity 
among indicators and their relationship with crisis period growth.  As previously indicated, 
if one looks at the current account variable, it is shown that when estimating a model 
including the current account as a predictor and the log of GDP per capita as a covariate, a 2 
class model provides the best fit.  This predictor is strongly significant for both classes and 
is statistically different between classes.  This provides evidence that the relationship 
between the level of the current account and crisis period economic growth is 
heterogeneous across 2 different groups or 'classes' of countries.  The log of income per 
capita helps us to predict which class individual countries belong to14.   
 Using the results from Tables 5.1-5.4, we continue our analysis by estimating LC 
regression models using variables that have shown at least some success in the bivariate 
analysis.  Since we have little theory from the literature to help us guide our specification, 
we admit this approach to variable selection is somewhat ad-hoc.  Nonetheless, we 
estimate a series of crisis models using different sets of variables, similar to other empirical 
papers in the EWM literature.  BIC and AICc  statistics guide model selection.  The results of 
this exercise are reported in Table 6. 
 Table 6 provides the results from several versions of latent class financial crisis 
regression models, the BIC and/or AICc criterion guide us toward the choice of 2 class 
models15.    Under the column ‘Model 1’ we report the coefficients on the parameters of a 2 
class model that includes the current account, the growth in banking credit, inflation, and a 
dummy for major commodity exporter as the included set of explanatory variables, and the 
log of GDP per capita as a covariate.  This column is divided into two sub columns, one for 
each class.  'Profile' reports the expected cluster size according to posterior membership 
probabilities estimated for each observation (country).  The R-square statistic is reported 
for each individual class as well as for the overall model.   
 We can see from the results of model 1 that a more favorable current account 
position had a positive effect on growth outcomes for both classes, although the effect is 
much greater for class 2.  To be specific, on average, a 10% increase in a country's current 
account/GDP ratio is associated with a .7% loss to the crisis period growth rate for 
countries in class 1 and a 5.8% decrease in the growth rate for countries in class 2.  This is 
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 Appendix 1 provides the classification of countries that each model generates, as well as the mean growth and 
income of each class.  Some of the variation in countries listed comes from countries being added/dropped 
depending on the included variables, due to missing observations. 
an example of parameter heterogeneity demonstrated by the effect of the current account 
on different subpopulations in the sample, as the coefficient is statistically significantly 
different within, as well as between, classes.  Pre-crisis growth in banking credit had a 
significantly negative effect on crisis period growth for both classes, with the magnitude of 
the effect significantly larger for class 2.  A 10% larger increase in banking credit from 
2000-2006 is associated with .391% loss of crisis period GDP growth on average for 
countries in Class 1 and a 3.345% loss in crisis period growth for those in class 2.  CPI 
inflation seemed to slightly weather the crisis for class 1, while hurting growth 
performance in class 2. The interpretation of the coefficient is analogous to that of the 
banking credit variable  Lastly, being a significant commodity exporter was beneficial to 
growth performance in class 1, but detrimental to countries in class 2.  Specifically, being a 
major commodity exporter resulted in a 3.363% higher crisis period growth rate on 
average for countries in class 1, and 3.95% lower growth for those in class 2.  The 
coefficients on the covariate (log of 2006 real GDP per capita) tell us that richer countries 
are more likely to belong to class 1 and poorer countries more likely to belong to class 2.  
This should not be interpreted as a completely deterministic relationship, as some poorer 
countries can belong to class 1 while it is similarly possible for richer countries to belong to 
class 2, as the covariate values help determine probabilities of membership. In summary, 
this baseline model demonstrates the parameter heterogeneity that is possible when using 
latent class models. 
  To achieve a more parsimonious specification, the LatentGold 4.0 software allows 
us to place restrictions on certain parameters on a class by class basis.  For example, we can 
restrict the coefficient of the current account variable to be zero for class 1 in model 2, 
which we do (after estimating an unrestricted model), since the coefficient estimate is now 
statistically insignificant in this new specification before imposing the restriction.  We 
impose restrictions like this, along with cross-class parameter equality restrictions, on 
certain specification across the models we estimated.  The restrictions are imposed after 
estimating an unrestricted model, and are justified by the resulting improvement in the 
information criterion statistic. 
 Model 2 demonstrates this fact, where we include the degree of credit market 
regulation as an additional predictor.  The results of this model are reported under the 
column 'Model 2'.  Estimation of this model with credit market regulation included causes 
the current account variable to enter insignificantly for class 1.  Credit market regulation 
also enters insignificantly for class 1 but significantly for class 2.  The credit market 
regulation variable is a 10 point scale index variable where higher values represent more 
liberal credit markets.  For class 2, a 1 point increase in the credit market regulation index 
is associated with a 3.34% lower crisis period growth rate, on average.  Other than the 
parameters that have been restricted to zero, the sign of the remaining coefficients is 
preserved, although their magnitudes change to varying degrees. 
 Model 3 adds the degree of stock market capitalization from 2003-2006 as an 
additional predictor.  Surprisingly, this variable enters positively for class 1 and negatively 
for class 2.  Models 4 through 6 add selected financial variables (the bank claim/deposit 
ratio and the bank nonperforming loan ratio) found to be significant in the bivariate 
regression exercise.  These variables are significant for class 2 but insignificant for class 1.  
Models 7 and 8 add an institutional indicator, the voice & accountability index.  Once again, 
this variable enters as a significant predictor for class 2 but not for class 1.  Model 8 
includes the log of GDP per capita in 2006 as a predictor as well as a covariate, and we see 
that including this measure results in an insignificant coefficient for both classes, and does 
not change the results for other included predictors.  We estimated several other models 
adding additional predictors from the long list of Tables 5.1-5.4, but these variables were 
generally insignificant and did not impact the results. 
 Appendix 1 includes tables providing the predicted class membership for all 
countries under each estimated model.  The countries are assigned classes based on the 
estimated probability of belonging to a particular class, which is a function of included 
variables.  As demonstrated in the tables, the assignment of countries remains relatively 
stable across specifications.  Class 1 is made up of countries with a relatively larger mean 
GDP per capita and a lower average crisis period growth rate, typically in the negative 
region.  Countries in class 2 tended to be made up of a smaller selection of poorer, 
emerging market countries that grew positively on average during the crisis.  Some of the 
small differences in means and country assignments across specifications can be attributed 
to the dropping out or reentry of some countries due to the particular specification, on the 
part of missing observations. 
  The main implications from Table 6 are that there is relatively abundant evidence of 
parameter heterogeneity among predictors of crisis period growth performance, and that a 
2 class model provides the best fit for prediction, given the currently available data.  The 
growth in banking credit from 2000-2006 appears to be the most robust predictor of 
variation in the growth impact of the 08-09 crisis, having very similar coefficients in sign 
and magnitude across specifications.  There is evidence that pre-crisis inflation and the 
degree of credit market regulation are important predictors for class 2, although the 
magnitude of the coefficient is not as consistent across models.  Evidence is provided that a 
country's status as a major commodity exporter is also an important predictor for both 
classes across models.  There is some evidence that financial and institutional variables 
such as indicators from the banking sector and the voice & accountability index may also 
play a role in predicting crisis period growth performance.  These results contradict those 
found in the BMA analysis conducted above, suggesting that the standard linear models 
often found in the EWM literature fail to capture the heterogeneous relationships inherent 
in the data. 
4. Robustness Checks 
 It is worth noting that the effects of the 2008-09 crisis lingered for many advanced 
countries after the initial global downturn.  In particular, many European countries 
experienced a double-dip recession, where growth fell into the negative territory once 
again during the year 2012.  As an additional check, we adjust the dependent variable to 
2012 economic growth, while keeping the same baseline specification.  The results from 
this exercise are provided in Table 7.  Unlike the 2008-09 period, a one class model 
provides the best fit, suggesting that heterogeneity is not a factor in modeling the lingering 
effects well after the initial crisis phase.  Buildup in credit and status as a commodity 
exporter do still have some explanatory power with regards to economic performance 
during this period, but the power of the baseline model is reduced. 
 The latent class regression models of Table 6 provide a reasonably well fit model of 
the 2008-09 financial crisis.  If the indicators identified are to be considered truly useful for 
prediction of future crises in EWM models, they must have out of sample predictive power.  
As a first test of this, we attempt to fit the same baseline specification (model 1 from Table 
6) to an alternative crisis period.  We choose the period of the last major global financial 
episode, the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  If the model appears to similarly fit the alternate 
period, there may be substance to the claim that the model may be useful in predicting 
future crises.  Table 8 provides a series of robustness checks in which the baseline 
specification is re-estimated using both revised (updated) data as well as an alternate 
sample period, the 1997 Asian crisis.  We also check the model to the use of de-trended real 
GDP growth rates.  We look at de-trended rates when introducing the 1997 crisis period for 
a couple of reasons.  Firstly, the overall impact of the crisis on global economic growth 
rates was much smaller on average than that of the 2008-09 crisis, so it may be more 
revealing to look at countries' departure from their overall trend during that period.  
Secondly, for the countries hardest hit by the crisis (the East Asian tigers), the peak to 
trough drop in growth rates from 1997 to 1998 is, in some cases, quite striking.   For 
example, South Korea dropped from a growth rate of real GDP in 1997 of 4.5% to a rate of -
7.1% in 1998.  De-trended growth rates pick up the dramatic and sudden swings in growth 
rates particular to periods of financial crisis. 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the model does not perform well when fit to unadjusted 
1998 growth rates, as shown in the rightmost panel of the top half of Table 8.  Using 
unadjusted growth rates likely hides the true impact of the 1997 crisis, which had a 
dampened impact on strongly growing developed economies.  When we apply the model to 
de-trended growth rates, however, the fit of the model improves substantially.  In fact, the 
model for de-trended growth rates across crisis periods (appearing in the bottom half of 
Table 8) shows some significant similarities.  Although some coefficient estimates do in 
some cases differ in magnitude and/or sign, the role of the variables in explaining variation 
in impact of the crisis remains, with the exception of the current account variable for the 
1997 crisis.  In particular, a 2-class model best fits either crisis, with the log of pre-crisis 
income per capita a significant determinant of class membership for both episodes.  Pre-
crisis growth in banking credit appears to be a significant and negative predictor of crisis 
period growth performance across specifications and crisis episodes.  This lends support 
for the robustness of this variable in explaining variation in crisis impact.  Status as a 
commodity exporter and pre-crisis inflation also retain explanatory power, although their 
signs do change across specifications in some cases.  This may result from the differential 
nature of the crises. 
 There may be several reasons why the model fitting the 08-09 is not entirely 
consistent with the 1997 Asian financial crisis, qualitatively speaking.  The nature of the 
crisis itself differed in the key aspect that it originated in, and affected, emerging market 
economies more severely than developed economies, in contrast to the 2008-09 crisis 
which centered on the developed world.  Of course, the global downturn was also much 
less severe and shorter in length than the 08-09 crisis.  Therefore, the fundamental nature 
of each crisis differs.  This fact highlights the difficulty in creating simple linear models to 
predict financial crises, as they are unlikely to model these complex relationships.  The 
results remain interesting however, as the included variables do seem to retain some 
explanatory power across time periods, even if their qualitative interpretation changes 
across episodes in some cases.  Similarly, the model identifies 2 classes for each period, 
where pre-crisis income helps in predicting class membership.  It remains an open 
question if finding additional sources of the heterogeneity in relationships across episodes 
may improve the performance of early warning models, which provides an area for future 
work.  What is provided here is evidence that simple linear models fail to capture the 
complex nature of financial crises.  When models that incorporate heterogeneous 
relationships are used, sets of indicators appear to be robust across crisis episodes. 
5. Conclusion 
 Rose and Spiegel (2009a,b) and Rose and Spiegel (2010) use a comprehensive set of 
financial and macroeconomic indicators to demonstrate that almost no indicators are 
empirically robust in terms of predicting crisis incidence, which would be a necessary first 
step in building an empirical EWM.  We find that this result is robust to model uncertainty 
using Bayesian model averaging, as no individual indicators are statistically significant or 
have a high posterior probability of inclusion in the model.   
However, when using a nonlinear method such as latent class models, our results 
appear quite different.  We provide evidence that the sample can generally be split into two 
'classes', which are influenced by countries' initial income. The parameters of indicator 
variables differ between classes in magnitude, sign, and even in inclusion in the model of 
the separate classes.  This reveals a more complex crisis-response framework than 
assumed in previous EWM literature.  We also provide evidence that several indicators are 
useful and robust in explaining variations in impact from the 2008-09 crisis, including the 
growth in banking credit from 2000-06, inflation, the degree of credit market regulation, 
status as a major commodity exporter, and several financial and institutional variables.   
Our results also appear to be robust to other crises using alternative data.  In 
particular, we applied the model to data from the 1997 financial crisis period.   We find that 
while the results are not entirely consistent across episodes, due to the changing 
qualitative interpretation of some variables, there is evidence of similar heterogeneity 
persisting across periods, where the chosen set of indicators explain variation in the impact 
of the crisis.  A particularly robust indicator includes the pre-crisis growth in banking 
credit, which performs well across specifications and sample period.  A 2-class model best 
fits both the 2008-09 crisis as well as the 1997 Asian crisis, where the 2 classes are 
differentiated by their mean income levels as well as the extent of the real damage to their 
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Table 1 - Variable Description
Category 1 - Size and Income Category 6 - Macroeconomic Policies
Log of Real GDP per Capita, 2006 Currency Union (dummy=1 if member of)
Log of Total Population, 2006 Inflation Targeter (dummy)
Category 2 - Financial Policies M2/GDP
Bank Ownership (share of bank deposits held in privately owned banks), 2006 M3/GDP
Foreign Bank Competition (denial rate of foreign bank license applications), 2006 Total Debt (%GDP)
Credit Market Regulation Debt Service Burden (%GDP)
Overall Capital Stringency, 2003 CPI Inflation
Ability to Take Prompt Corrective Action, 2003 Moody's Sovereign LT Rating 2006
Capital Regulatory Index, 2003 Net Government Borrowing/Lending (%GDP)
Official Supervisory Power, 2003 Net Government Debt (%GDP)
Restructuring Power, 2003 Regulation of Credit/Labor/Business
Power to Declare Insolvency, 2003 GDP Growth, 2006
Category 3 - Financial Conditions Category 7 - Institutional Factors
Private Sector Domestic Credit (share of GDP), 2006 EFW Index of Credit/Labor/Business Regulation
Change in Banking Credit% GDP 2000-2006 Polity Index, 2006
Change in Private Credit% GDP 2000-2006 Control of Corruption, 2002
Domestic Bank Credit % GDP 2006 Regulatory Quality
Domestic Private Credit % GDP 2006 Rule of Law
Bank Liquid Reserves (share of assets) Political Rights
Bank Nonperforming Loan Ratio Civil Liberty, 2005
Bank Capital (share of assets) Government Size
Bank Claims (share of assets), 2006 Security of Property Rights
Category 4 - Asset Price Appreciation Advanced Economy
Percentage Change in Real Estate Prices (2000-06) Voice & Accountability Index
Market Capitalization (share of GDP) Overall Economic Freedom Index
Stocks Total Value Traded/GDP Government Effectiveness Index
Stock Market Growth Labor Market Regulations
Category 5 - International Imbalances Business Regulations
Net External Position (% GDP) Sound Money Access
Current Account (%GDP) Not a Financial Center
Average Current Account/GDP Ratio 2004-2007 Share of Manufacturing in GDP
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime Category 8 - Geography
External Debt Stocks % GNI 2006 Log of Latitude
External Short Term Debt/GDP - extdebtgdp Regional Dummy
Short Term Debt/Total External Debt Commodity Exporter Dummy
Total Resevers(-gold)/GDP Category 9 - Financial and Trade Linkages
Real Effective Exchange Rate Change 2000-2006 US TIC Assets/GDP
US TIC Equity/GDP
US TIC Long Debt/GDP
US TIC Debt/GDP
US TIC Treasuries/GDP
Trade with US (% total trade)
Average Growth in Trading Partners' GDP 2005-2007










Table 2 - Country List
Europe Central Asia Carribean/Island
Albania Kazakhstan Antigua & Barbuda
Armenia Kyrgyz Rep. Bahamas
Austria Sri Lanka Barbados
Belarus Turkey Bermuda
Belgium Turkmenistan Cuba
Bulgaria Middle East/North Africa Dominican Rep.
Croatia Algeria Haiti
Cyprus Bahrain Jamaica
Czech Rep. Egypt Netherlands Antilles
Denmark Iran Puerto Rico
Estonia Israel St. Kitts and Nevis
Finland Kuwait Trinidad and Tobago





Iceland Saudi Arabia Costa Rica
Italy Tunisia Ecuador
Latvia United Arab Emirates El Salvador
Lithuania Sub-Saharan Africa Panama
Luxembourg Botswana Paraguay
Macedonia Eq. Guinea Peru
Malta Gabon Uruguay
Netherlands Guyana Venezuela
Norway Mauritius East Asia
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Table 3 - BMA Result using UIP g-prior 
Variable PIP Post Mean Post Std. Dev. 
Credit Market Regulation 0.413 -1.206 1.587 
Growth in Banking Credit 0.379 -0.037 0.053 
Bank Claim/Deposit Ratio 0.289 -1.634 2.830 
Log of Latitude 0.234 -0.583 1.173 
Growth in Private Credit 0.206 -2.698 5.914 
Foreign Banking Competition 0.203 -0.317 0.702 
Control of Corruption 0.164 0.957 2.539 
Moody's 2006 Sovereign Credit Rating 0.152 0.145 0.399 
Bank Ownership 0.116 -0.098 0.322 
Net Government Borrowing/Lending, % GDP 0.091 0.037 0.137 
Regulatory Quality 0.083 -0.621 2.531 
Current Account/GDP 0.070 1.379 6.301 
Polity 2 Index 0.065 -0.023 0.106 
Manufacturing Share 0.065 -0.014 0.068 
Commondity Exporter 0.055 0.157 0.855 
Reserves/GDP 0.054 -0.006 0.031 
Advanced Economy 0.048 -0.173 1.038 
Rule of Law 0.047 0.129 1.089 
Log of 2006 GDP per capita 0.044 -0.114 0.761 
Government Effectiveness Index 0.040 -0.009 1.016 
CPI Inflation 0.039 -0.014 0.104 
Trade Share with US 0.037 0.002 0.017 
Net External Position 0.036 -0.092 0.729 
Bank Capital/Asset Ratio 0.034 -0.009 0.077 
Size of Government 0.032 0.018 0.158 
Voice and Accountability Index 0.029 -0.034 0.504 
Log of Population 0.028 0.011 0.151 
Stock Market Capitalization 2003-2006 0.028 0.025 0.259 
Liquid Resevers/Assets 0.027 -0.001 0.025 
Bank Nonperforming Loan Ratio 0.025 0.001 0.049 
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime 0.025 -0.025 0.350 
    
Mean No. Regressors 3.1571   
g-Prior UIP   
Model Prior Random   
Corr PMP 0.9994   
 
 






Bank Claim/Deposit Ratio 0.553 -2.314 2.630 
Control of Corruption 0.487 2.616 3.648 
Growth in Banking Credit 0.474 -0.030 0.042 
Log of Latitude 0.437 -0.842 1.253 
Credit Market Regulation 0.410 -0.681 1.313 
Reserves/GDP 0.390 -0.048 0.081 
Moody's 2006 Sovereign Credit Rating 0.377 0.233 0.440 
Advanced Economy 0.366 -1.580 2.858 
Foreign Banking Competition 0.361 -0.335 0.641 
Regulatory Quality 0.348 -1.797 3.599 
Net Government Borrowing/Lending, % GDP 0.335 0.100 0.198 
Growth in Private Credit 0.327 -2.187 4.801 
Bank Ownership 0.310 -0.152 0.378 
Polity 2 Index 0.287 -0.075 0.185 
Manufacturing Share 0.263 -0.033 0.100 
Net External Position 0.256 -0.529 1.621 
Rule of Law 0.255 0.339 2.387 
Current Account/GDP 0.254 1.779 9.142 
Bank Capital/Asset Ratio 0.251 -0.065 0.189 
Stock Market Capitalization 2003-2006 0.245 0.248 0.801 
Government Effectiveness Index 0.243 0.094 2.220 
CPI Inflation 0.240 -0.051 0.213 
Log of 2006 GDP per capita 0.232 -0.285 1.404 
Trade Share with US 0.230 -0.004 0.036 
Size of Government 0.223 0.069 0.322 
Log of Population 0.222 0.096 0.431 
Voice and Accountability Index 0.220 -0.042 1.493 
Commondity Exporter 0.217 0.082 1.282 
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime 0.213 -0.169 0.979 
Liquid Resevers/Assets 0.212 -0.008 0.069 
Bank Nonperforming Loan Ratio 0.204 -0.014 0.157 
    
Mean No. Regressors 9.4411   
g-Prior Hyper (a=2.03704)   
Model Prior Random   







Variable BIC selection CAIC selection 1 class sign. 2 class sign. 3 class sign. ly included (covariate) ly included (regressor)
Advanced Economy (dummy) 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. ~s ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class ~s ign. yes yes
US TIC Short Debt/GDP 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class 2 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class yes no
US TIC Long Debt/GDP 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class ~s ign. - 1 Class yes no
US TIC Equity/GDP 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. ins ign. yes no
US TIC Debt/GDP 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
3 Class 2 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
US TIC Assets/GDP 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ~s ign. - 2 Class ~s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class 2 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class yes no
US TIC Treasuries/GDP 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class yes no
Bank Ownership 2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no no
2 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. yes yes
Bank Capita l/Asset Ratio 2006 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class 2 Class ins ign. ~s ign. - 1 Class s ign. yes no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. s ign. yes yes
Bank Nonperforming Loan Ratio 2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. no no
2 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class ~s ign. s ign. s ign. no yes
1 Class 1 Class ~s ign. s ign. s ign. yes yes
Bus iness  Regulations  2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. ~s ign. - 1 Class ins ign. yes no
Current Account % GDP 2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no no
2 Class 2 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. yes no
Current Account/GDP 2007 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no no
2 Class 2 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. yes yes
Average Current Account/GDP ratio 2004-2007 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no no
2 Class 2 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. yes no
Capita l  Regulatory Index 2003 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes no
Civi l  Liberties  Index 2005 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Bank Cla im/Depos i t Ratio 2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes




Variable BIC selection CAIC selection 1 class sign. 2 class sign. 3 class sign. ly included (covariate) ly included (regressor)
Big Commodity Exporter 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. no no
2 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class ~s ign. no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. yes yes
Control  of Corruption Index 2002 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class yes no
CPI Inflation 2006 1 Class 1 Class ~s ign. ~s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
2 Class 1 Class ~s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 2 Class no yes
2 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Credit Market Regulations  2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 2 Class s ign. no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. ~s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Change in Banking Credit% GDP 2000-2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. ~s ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. yes yes
Debt Service Burden (%GDP) 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. yes no
Power to Declare Insolvency 2003 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. ~s ign. - 1 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. ins ign. yes no
Domestic Bank Credit % GDP 2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. ~s ign. yes yes
Domestic Private Credit % GDP 2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. ins ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Change in Private Credit% GDP 2000-2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
East As ia/Paci fic Dummy 1 Class 1 Class s ign. ~s ign. s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class s ign. ~s ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes no
EFW Summary 2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class 1 Class s ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class yes no
Europe/Centra l  As ia  Dummy 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 1 Class yes no
External  Debt Stocks  % GNI 2006 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
External  Debt (%GDP) 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
External  Short Term Debt/GDP 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. ~s ign. s ign. yes yes




Variable BIC selection CAIC selection 1 class sign. 2 class sign. 3 class sign. ly included (covariate) ly included (regressor)
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class ins ign. no no
2 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. ins ign. yes no
Foreign Bank Competi tion 2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no no
2 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class yes yes
Government Effectiveness  Index 2002 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
GDP growth 2006 2 Class 2 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
3 Class 3 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
Real  Hous ing Price Appreciation 2000-2006 2 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no no
2 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. yes no
2 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Inflation Targeter 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class yes no
Labor Market Regulations  2006 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class yes no
Latin American/Carribean Dummy 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. ins ign. no no
1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class yes no
Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets  2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Log of Latti tude 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. ~s ign. s ign. - 1 Class yes no
Log of 2006 Population 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no no
2 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class yes no
Log of 2006 GDP per Capita 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class yes no
M2/GDP 2006 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. s ign. - 1 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
M3/GDP 2006 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ~s ign. - 2 Class s ign. - 1 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
Share of Manufacturing in GDP 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. s ign. - 1 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class ~s ign. ins ign. s ign. no yes
1 Class 1 Class ~s ign. ~s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Middle East/North Africa  dummy 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no no
2 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. yes no
Market Capita l i zation/GDP 2003-2006 1 Class 1 Class ~ins ign. s ign. s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class 2 Class ~ins ign. ins ign. ~s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Moody Sovereign LT For Rating 2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. ins ign. ~s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Table 5.3 - Bivariate LCM Regression Results
 
Variable BIC selection CAIC selection 1 class sign. 2 class sign. 3 class sign. ly included (covariate) ly included (regressor)
Net Government Borrowing/Lending (%GDP) 2006 1 Class 1 Class ~s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class 2 Class ~s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Net Government Debt (%GDP) 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
2 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Net External  Pos i tion % GDP - 2004 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes no
Not A Financia l  Center Dummy 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. ins ign. no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. ins ign. yes no
Officia l  Supervisory Power 2003 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. ins ign. no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. ins ign. yes no
Overa l l  Capita l  Stringency 2003 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ~s ign. - 2 Class s ign. no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes no
Pol i ty Index 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Pol i tica l  Rights  Index 2005 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes no
Private Credit by Depos i t Money Banks 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
Prompt Corrective Action 2003 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. ins ign. yes no
Property Rights  2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. yes no
Real  Effective Exchange Rate change 2000-2006 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
2 Class 2 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class ~s ign. - 2 Class yes no
Regulatory Qual i ty Index 2002 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. yes no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no yes
s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Regulation Credit/Labor/Bus iness  2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
Total  Reserves(-gold)/GDP 2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class 1 Class s ign. ~s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class ~s ign. ins ign. s ign. no yes
1 Class 1 Class ~s ign. ins ign. s ign. yes yes
Restructure Power 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
2 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. ins ign. yes no
Rule of Law 2002 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. yes no
1 Class 1 Class ~s ign. s ign. s ign. - 1 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class ~s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Size of Government 2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. ~s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class 2 Class s ign. ins ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes no
Sound Money Access  2006 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class 1 Class s ign. ins ign. ins ign. yes no
Short Term Debt/Tota l  External  Debt 2006 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. yes no
Percent Change in Stock Market Values  (USD) 2000-2007 1 Class 1 Class s ign. ~s ign. - 2 Class ~s ign. no no
2 Class 2 Class s ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class yes no
Stock Market Tota l  Va lue Traded/GDP 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class no no
2 Class 2 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class yes no
Sub-Saharan Africa  Dummy 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. ins ign. no no
2 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
Trade with USA/Tota l  Trade 1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class no no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes no
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class no yes
1 Class 1 Class ins ign. ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class yes yes
Voice & Accountabi l i ty Index 2002 1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no no
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes no
2 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. no yes
1 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. s ign. - 2 Class yes yes
Average Growth in Trading Partners ' GDP 2005-2007 2 Class 1 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no no
2 Class 2 Class ins ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class yes no
Average Growth in Trading Partners ' GDP 2008-2008 2 Class 2 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class no no
2 Class 2 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class yes no
2 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 2 Class no yes
2 Class 1 Class s ign. s ign. - 1 Class s ign. - 1 Class yes yes
Table 5.4 - Bivariate LCM Regression Results
 



























Dependent = 2012 Growth
Class 1 Class 2 Class 1
Profile 0.6589 0.3411 -
Obs 92 88
Rsq class 0.5451 0.8265 -
Rsq Overall 0.8021 0.2121
Current Account/GDP 7.0956 58.1518 1.19
1.7133 6.7223 0.4516
Growth in Banking Credit -0.0391 -0.3345 -0.0199
-3.1779 -6.464 -2.2923
CPI Inflation 0.5085 -0.7681 0.1466
2.3129 -3.0421 1.5018
Commondity Exporter 3.3631 -3.9504 1.9848
3.0097 -1.5778 3.1626
Log of 2006 GDP per capita (covariate) 0.6021 -0.6021 -
2.8594 -2.8594
Variable
Dependent = 2008-09 Growth
Table 7 - The Double Dip
 
 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2
Profile 0.6589 0.3411 0.527 0.473 0.6789 0.3211
Obs 92 90 86
Rsq class 0.5451 0.8265 0.6919 0.4716 0.0643 0.4315
Rsq Overall 0.8021 0.619 0.4753
Current Account/GDP 7.0956 58.1518 -0.0272 0.4511 -0.0228 0.5996
1.7133 6.7223 -0.8257 2.3576 -1.4782 3.7693
Growth in Banking Credit -0.0391 -0.3345 -0.0619 -0.1715 -0.0064 0.0133
-3.1779 -6.464 -6.8594 -2.5277 -0.7693 0.4729
CPI Inflation 0.5085 -0.7681 0.5172 -0.2894 -0.2729 -7.1159
2.3129 -3.0421 2.3841 -0.8102 -0.4164 -2.2151
Commondity Exporter 3.3631 -3.9504 5.9385 -2.081 0.0075 -0.0578
3.0097 -1.5778 4.6736 -2.081 0.8334 -1.0604
Log of 2006 GDP per capita (covariate) 0.6021 -0.6021 0.7335 -0.7335 0.6094 -0.6094
2.8594 -2.8594 -2.2653 2.2653 2.8112 -2.8112
Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2
Profile 0.6155 0.3845 0.6674 0.3326
Obs 90 86
Rsq class 0.4593 0.6266 0.3368 0.7011
Rsq Overall 0.6546 0.7286
Current Account/GDP -0.1416 0.5445 -0.008 0.2358
-2.8312 1.9701 -0.744 0.9835
Growth in Banking Credit -0.033 -0.276 -0.443 -0.0151
-2.8325 -2.7523 -3.5747 -0.4266
CPI Inflation -1.4188 0.1523 0.0392 0.5956
-2.017 0.2132 2.1251 4.4281
Commondity Exporter 4.0878 -2.081 -1.473 -8.8664
2.1889 0.4757 -1.8561 -3.9098
Log of 2006 GDP per capita (covariate) 0.728 -0.728 0.3852 -0.3852
2.4377 -2.4377 3.0803 -3.0803
Variable
Baseline - Updated Data 1997 Asian Crisis
Dep. Var. - 08-09 Growth - 5 yr Trend Dep. Var. - 1998 Growth - 5 yr Trend
Table 8 - Robustness Across Data/Crisis Episode
Variable
Baseline - (RS 2010 Data) 1997 Asian CrisisBaseline - Updated Data
Dep. Var. - 2008-09 Real GDPGrowth Dep. Var. - 2008-09 Real GDPGrowth Dep. Var - 1998 Real GDP Growth
Appendix 1 - Country Classification Tables
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2
-0.2653 6.7677 -0.5278 2.7584 -0.0326 1.8644 -0.4889 2.5855
9.7462 8.9735 9.7379 8.9193 9.6961 9.0135 9.719 8.9862
Algeria Albania Algeria Albania Argentina China Argentina Egypt
Argentina Bahrain Argentina Bahrain Armenia Egypt Armenia Estonia
Armenia Belarus Armenia China Australia Estonia Australia Indonesia
Australia China Australia Dominican Rep Austria Kyrgyz Republic Austria Iran
Austria Dominican Rep Austria Egypt Belgium Latvia Barbados Kyrgyz Republic
Belgium Egypt Belgium Estonia Botswana Lithuania Belgium Latvia
Botswana Estonia Botswana Guyana Brazil Macedonia (FYR) Botswana Lithuania
Brazil Georgia Brazil Haiti Bulgaria Mexico Brazil Macedonia (FYR)
Bulgaria Guyana Bulgaria Jamaica Canada Morocco Bulgaria Mexico
Canada Haiti Canada Kyrgyz Republic Chile Namibia Canada Morocco
Chile Indonesia Chile Latvia Colombia Oman Chile Namibia
Colombia Jamaica Colombia Lithuania Costa Rica Panama Colombia Oman
Costa Rica Kyrgyz Republic Costa Rica Macedonia (FYR) Croatia Papua New Guinea Costa Rica Panama
Croatia Latvia Croatia Mexico Cyprus Paraguay Croatia Papua New Guinea
Cyprus Lithuania Cyprus Morocco Czech Rep Peru Cyprus Peru
Czech Rep Macedonia (FYR) Czech Rep Namibia Denmark Poland Czech Rep Poland
Denmark Morocco Denmark Oman Ecuador Russia Denmark Russia
Ecuador Oman Ecuador Panama El Salvador Turkey Ecuador Tunisia
El Salvador Panama El Salvador Papua New Guinea Finland Ukraine El Salvador Turkey
Finland Papua New Guinea Finland Paraguay France Finland Ukraine
France Peru France Peru Georgia France Uruguay
Gabon Poland Gabon Poland Germany, West Georgia
Germany, West Qatar Georgia Russia Greece Germany, West
Greece Tunisia Germany, West Turkey Guyana Greece
Hong Kong Turkey Greece Ukraine Hong Kong Guyana
Hungary Ukraine Hong Kong Uruguay Hungary Hong Kong
Iceland Uruguay Hungary Iceland Hungary
Iran Venezuela Iceland Indonesia Iceland
Ireland Indonesia Iran Ireland
Israel Iran Ireland Israel
Italy Ireland Israel Italy
Japan Israel Italy Jamaica
Kazakhstan Italy Jamaica Japan
Korea Japan Japan Kazakhstan
Kuwait Kazakhstan Kazakhstan Korea
Libya Korea Korea Kuwait
Luxembourg Kuwait Kuwait Luxembourg
Macau Luxembourg Luxembourg Malaysia
Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Malta
Malta Malta Malta Mauritius
Mauritius Mauritius Mauritius Netherlands
Mexico Netherlands Netherlands New Zealand
Namibia New Zealand New Zealand Paraguay
Netherlands Portugal Portugal Portugal
New Zealand Romania Romania Romania
Paraguay Singapore Singapore Singapore
Portugal Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia
Romania Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia
Russia South Africa South Africa South Africa
Saudi Arabia Spain Spain Spain
Seychelles Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Sri Lanka
Singapore Sweden Sweden Sweden
Slovakia Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland
Slovenia Thailand Thailand Thailand
South Africa Trinidad & Tobago Trinidad & Tobago Trinidad & Tobago
Spain Tunisia Tunisia United States
Sri Lanka UK UK Venezuela







Mean Income Mean Income Mean Income Mean Income
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mean Growth Mean Growth Mean Growth Mean Growth
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2
-0.6755 1.3426 -0.709 2.3624 -0.333 -0.4165 -0.5626 -0.434
9.8385 9.0907 9.8185 9.0256 9.7662 8.98 9.7795 8.9814
Argentina China Argentina China Argentina Brazil Argentina Brazil
Armenia Egypt Armenia Egypt Armenia China Armenia China
Australia Estonia Australia Estonia Australia Colombia Australia Colombia
Austria Georgia Austria Georgia Austria Egypt Austria Egypt
Belgium Latvia Belgium Latvia Barbados Estonia Barbados Estonia
Brazil Lithuania Brazil Macedonia (FYR) Belgium Georgia Belgium Georgia
Bulgaria Macedonia (FYR) Bulgaria Mexico Botswana Guyana Botswana Guyana
Canada Mexico Canada Morocco Bulgaria Jamaica Bulgaria Jamaica
Chile Morocco Chile Namibia Canada Kyrgyz Republic Canada Korea
Colombia Namibia Colombia Oman Chile Latvia Chile Kyrgyz Republic
Costa Rica Oman Costa Rica Panama Costa Rica Lithuania Costa Rica Latvia
Croatia Panama Croatia Paraguay Croatia Macedonia (FYR) Croatia Lithuania
Czech Rep Paraguay Czech Rep Russia Cyprus Mexico Cyprus Macedonia (FYR)
Denmark Peru Denmark Thailand Czech Rep Morocco Czech Rep Mexico
Ecuador Poland Ecuador Turkey Denmark Namibia Denmark Morocco
El Salvador Russia El Salvador Ukraine Ecuador Oman Ecuador Namibia
Finland Thailand Finland Uruguay El Salvador Panama El Salvador Oman
France Turkey France Finland Papua New Guinea Finland Panama
Germany, West Ukraine Germany, West France Paraguay France Papua New Guinea
Greece Uruguay Greece Germany, West Peru Germany, West Paraguay
Hong Kong Hong Kong Greece Poland Greece Peru
Hungary Hungary Hong Kong Russia Hong Kong Poland
Iceland Iceland Hungary Tunisia Hungary Russia
Indonesia Indonesia Iceland Turkey Iceland Tunisia
Ireland Ireland Indonesia Ukraine Indonesia Turkey
Israel Israel Iran Iran Ukraine
Italy Italy Ireland Ireland
Japan Japan Israel Israel
Korea Korea Italy Italy
Kuwait Kuwait Japan Japan
Luxembourg Lithuania Kazakhstan Kazakhstan
Malaysia Luxembourg Korea Kuwait
Malta Malaysia Kuwait Luxembourg
Netherlands Malta Luxembourg Malaysia
Portugal Netherlands Malaysia Malta
Romania Peru Malta Mauritius
Singapore Poland Mauritius Netherlands
Slovakia Portugal Netherlands New Zealand
Slovenia Romania New Zealand Portugal
South Africa Singapore Portugal Romania
Spain Slovakia Romania Singapore
Sweden Slovenia Singapore Slovakia
Switzerland South Africa Slovakia Slovenia
Tunisia Spain Slovenia South Africa
UK Sweden South Africa Spain
United States Switzerland Spain Sri Lanka
Venezuela Tunisia Sri Lanka Sweden
UK Sweden Switzerland
United States Switzerland Thailand
Venezuela Thailand Trinidad & Tobago





Mean Income Mean Income Mean Income Mean Income
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Mean Growth Mean Growth Mean Growth Mean Growth
